Abstract. Deception boosts security for systems and components by denial, deceit, misinformation, camouflage and obfuscation. In this work an extensive overview of the deception technology environment is presented. Taxonomies, theoretical backgrounds, psychological aspects as well as concepts, implementations, legal aspects and ethics are discussed and compared.
Introduction
Sun Tzu once wrote "all warfare is based on deception" [ ]. This was long before the first digital devices. Since then, years ago, deception was an essential aspect of many fields, e.g. the military. Over the years deception was an essential aspect of military operations. In information security (IS), social engineering, as extensively described by Mitnick [ ] was the first use of deception. In and , Stoll [ ], respectively Cheswick [ ], transferred the concept of deception to defensive applications. These applications were called honeypots (HP). Later on the concept was generalized to Deception technology (DT), which is a superset of HPs and all other technologies relying on simulation and dissimulation. The Deception Toolkit published by Cohen was the first publicity available deception software [ ]. Over the last three decades, the concepts of deception experienced a rising popularity in information security. Perimeter-based security measures, such as firewalls and authentication mechanisms, do not provide a proper level of security in the context of insider threats and social engineering. Defense-in-depth strategies, such as signature-based intrusion detection and prevention, often suffer from a large number of false-positive detections, resulting in alarm fatigue of security information and event management systems. DTs come along with several major advantages such as low false-positive alerts and -day detection capabilities, making it a promising solution to tackle advanced security threats such as intrusion detection [ ] and attribution [ , ] . This work is structured as follows: In section , an overview of recent definitions and taxonomies related to DT are discussed and a taxonomy for this work is specified. DT is also put into context of the current IT-security environment. Furthermore, cognitive vulnerabilities are introduced and formal deception models are reviewed. Section gives a comparative overview of important and recent advances in deceptive software, honeytokens (HT) and HPs as well as field studies based on such technologies. Legal considerations, ethics and baseline security is discussed in section . In section , this work is concluded.
Background and Theory
In this section, research on the theoretical background of deception is reviewed. First, definitions and taxonomies are presented and determined for this work. DT is then integrated in the information security environment and research on psychological aspects of deception is discussed. The section is finished by a review on formal approaches to model deception as a game.
.
Definitions and Taxonomies
Whaley [ ] defines deception as a misperception that is intentionally induced by other entities. In his typology of perception, deception has three requirements: ) not a pluperception, ) not self-induced and ) not induced unintentional. Around ten years after this publication Bell and Whaley [ ] published a taxonomy of deception. This taxonomy classifies deception into two major categories: dissimulation and simulation. Dissimulation consists of three classes: masking, repacking and dazzling, whereas mimicking, inventing and decoying are within the simulation category. This taxonomy is the most frequently employed taxonomy for deception in the information security domain. In this work, the taxonomy from Bell and Whaley is used. .
Deception in the IT-Security Environment
The term IT security summarizes a broad range of technical and organizational measures aiming for the protection of a predefined set of assets. These assets can be classified according to the so-called CIAA security goals. CIAA stands for Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication and Availability and describes the protection goals of common IT-systems. DT cannot be mapped onto those security targets, but is commonly used for more abstract objectives, e.g. intrusion detection or analyzing attacker behavior. Another fundamental difference between classic IT security and DT is the use of Security by Obscurity. This term describes the intentional use of methods more complex than necessary or not published in order to prevent an attacker from gaining knowledge about the system. While it is not advised, and has repeatedly backfired in classic IT security, it is a valid technique to slow down attackers or distract them from possible targets. DT does not necessarily depend on obscurity, but is significantly more effective if the presence is unknown. The relation of classic IT security and DT is shown in figure . In this figure, three different layers of resources to protect, as well as three different protection mechanisms are shown. The resources can be grouped into network-, system and data-resources. Protection can be done by preventing an 
.

Formal Deception Models
Several researchers targeted the formal description of deception in games and models. As introduced in a previous subsection, Pawlick et al. [ ] recently published a game-theoretical taxonomy for deception. In their work, they also reviewed and categorized publications of deception games. Two works that were published after their review are discussed in this subsection. Wang et al. [ ] published a deception game for a specific use case. They focus on smart grid applications and the security benefits of deception against distributed denial of service attacks. In , Fraunholz and Schotten [ ] published a game which allows to model probes within the game. An attacker as well as a defender are able to choose the effort they want to invest in the obfuscation of the deception systems or the examination of systems of unknown nature. After the strategy is chosen, the attacker decides whether to attack, probe or ignore the system. They provided a heuristic solution for their game.
Deception Technology and Implementations
In this section three noteworthy topics are discussed. First, an overview of research on deceptive software and HTs is given. This overview excludes HPs, as they are reviewed in the second subsection. Finally, an overview of field studies and technological surveys on DTs is given.
.
Deceptive Software and Honeytokens
The term Honeytoken has been coined in by de Barros [ ]. The idea can be traced back to Spitzner [ ], who first defined a HT as the equivalent to a HP, with the constraint of representing an entity different from a computer. Since the inception of deception in information security, a vast number of concepts have been published. They cover different types of entities and focus on the generation of deceptive twins and their deployment. Many of these entities were given specific names referencing to the term honeypot e.g. honeywords for fake passwords in a database. ] introduced a framework with an integrated module for the analysis of system call traces.
Recently, the idea of using Linux containers as an alternative for virtual machines was investigated by Kedrowitsch [ ]. They concluded that containers are well suited for the deployment on low-powered devices but are trivial to detect. .
Anti-Honeypot
Field studies and technological surveys
In this subsection, field studies and technological surveys are considered. First, applications and deployments are examined. The kind and duration of deployment was analyzed, as well as the DT, success, attack vector and format of retrieved [ ] performed an analysis of real attackers' behavior in a vulnerable system. They introduced security experts to a system under attack in which they had deployed deception resources and monitored their behavior. Results were derived from a questionnaire answered by the experts after the experiment. Fraunholz et al. performed two field studies. In the first study, Fraunholz and Schotten [ ] proposed server-based deception mechanisms in order to hinder attackers. Fake banners, fake Robots.txt, tampered error response, an adaptive delay and honey files were presented in order to study attacker behavior under these circumstances. accesses were monitored. In the second study [ , ] , they analyzed attacker behavior monitored by six honeypots deployed in one consumer and five web hosting servers, during a period of days. Almost million access attempts were monitored by the LIHPs used. In these surveys, eleven evaluation features that were shared by at least two surveys were identified. They are numbered from F to F and are defined as follows: Interactivity (F ), scalability (F ), legal or ethical considerations (F ), type (F ), deployment (F ), advantages and disadvantages in comparison with other kinds of defense technologies (F ), quality and type of data and the derived insights (F ), type of the DT resource (F ), technical way of deployment and kind of DT (F ), detectability and anti-detection capabilities (F ) and extensibility (F ). 
Legal Considerations and Ethics
This sections discusses legal and ethical aspects. Entrapment, privacy and liablity are found to be discussed in most literature. Therefore table discriminates the reviewed literature by these subjects. Furthermore, the works are grouped by the country they consider and if ethical aspects are also taken into account.
Spitzner ] describe the problem of making the internet safer by introducing vulnerabilities to the public internet. The question how it is possible to secure the internet by adding weaknesses, and about the moral soundness of making people part of an experiment without their knowledge and consent is asked by Holz [ ]. Campbell [ ] questions moral implications of enticing someone to commit a crime, as well as mentions the problem of "adding fuel to the fire" when making a system vulnerable to attacks. Rowe and Rrushi [ ] attribute the ethical responsibility of DT to the programmer, while addressing the issue of self-modifying code and artificial intelligence.
Inclusion of DT into guidelines is only just starting. The German federal office for information security (BSI) published a baseline protection guideline [ ], which mentions the use of HPs. They consider them as anomaly detection mechanisms, while not mentioning DTs explicitly. Implicitly, however, they are described, for example in spoofing server banners.
Conclusion
In this work, the current state of the art in DT and adjacent domains is presented. Where applicable, previous surveys are referenced and supplemented with recent research. It was pointed out that DT is a beneficial extension for traditional ITsecurity. Emphasis was placed on requirement categories, such as psychological, formal, legal and ethical, as well as on recent trends, such as VMI and the field of industrial and critical infrastructure security. 
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